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Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000800020055-4

10 FEB 1962

27 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Resumption of Nuclear Testing

1. The US obviously cannot entirely escape adverse reactions to resumption of nuclear testing. The problem is to choose the time and manner to minimize those reactions.
2. Soviet propaganda has already been working to capitalize on those reactions. Its principal charge will be that the US action demonstrates that it is not approaching the new disarmament negotiations seriously and with good will. This Soviet effort will doubtless have some effect.
3. In order to minimize this effect it would seem preferable not to make a demonstrative announcement of a US decision either now or, even less desirable, after the disarmament talks have begun. Instead, it would probably be better to step up releases about the preparations in order that the decision will be taken for granted even before the

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DOCUMENT NO. 12  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐  
☒ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ REVIEWER: \_\_\_\_\_

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disarmament talks open. The object would be to avoid giving the Soviets a particular target against which to mount their propaganda campaign.

Further, when the disarmament talks begin the US must present and press hard a position on the control of future testing which is more persuasive than that of the Soviets.



SHERMAN KENT  
Assistant Director  
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